

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 05414 01 OF 04 091821Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----034173 091824Z /53

P R 091550Z SEP 77  
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5570  
INFO: RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 020  
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 ADDIS ABABA 5414

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR ET SO US  
SUBJECT: POST/HENZE TALK WITH SIAD

SUMMARY. IN CONVERSATION WITH AF/E DIRECTOR POST AND NSC  
STAFFER HENZE SEPTEMBER 8, SIAD SOUGHT TO ASSURE U.S. THAT  
SOMALIA HARBORED NO AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ON DJIBOUTI OR KENYA.  
HE CLAIMED THAT WITH SOVIET SUPPORT, MENGISTU WAS THREAT TO  
ALL NATIONS IN REGION. ETHIOPIA WAS DIRECT THREAT TO SOMALIA.  
HE INSISTED U.S. COULD NOT RPT NOT STAND IDLY BY GIVEN  
ITS COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS INTERNATIONAL  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND ASKED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER INTER-  
VENE TO SETTLE HORN ISSUES. SIAD DENIED OAU COULD MEDIATE  
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SOLUTION TO ETHIOPIAN CONFLICT. GIVEN U.S. POLICY OF NOT  
RPT NOT PROVIDING DIRECT DEFENSIVE ARMS WHILE OGADEN WAR-  
FARE CONTINUING, SIAD ASKED FOR THIRD-COUNTRY U.S. ARMS  
TRANSFERS FROM IRAN AND EGYPT. HE SUGGESTED U.S. POLICY  
OF NOT RPT NOT DELIVERING ARMS DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THIRD  
COUNTRIES LEFT HIM LITTLE ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO RETURN  
TO MOSCOW TO SEEK SOVIET FORGIVENESS. HAVING RAISED

POSSIBILITY -- ALBEIT OBLIQUELY -- SIAD REJECTED RETREAT FROM HIS FIGHT WITH MENGISTU AND PERSISTED IN MAINTAINING THAT FIGHTING IN OGADEN INVOLVED NO SOMALI MILITARY ELEMENTS BUT WAS STRUGGLE FOR SELF-LIBERATION BY LOCAL POPULATION. END SUMMARY.

1. RICHARD POST, DIRECTOR, AF/E; PAUL HENZE, NSC STAFF; AMBASSADOR; AND EMBOFF MET WITH SIAD FOR TWO AND A HALF HOUR CONVERSATION FROM 0030-0300 HOURS SEPTEMBER 8. SIAD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY VICE PRESIDENT KULMIYE AND AMBASSADOR ADDOU.

2. PRWSIDENT SIAD EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S PLEDGE OF SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA. HE REGRETTED THAT HE HAD NOT YET HAD OPPORTUNITY TO PERSONALLY CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN BECAUSE OF HIS BUSY SCHEDULE. HE WAS DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S INITIATIVE AND NEW UNDERSTANDING IN WASHINGTON OF SOMALIA'S SITUATION. HE REVIEWED SOMALIA'S SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND SPECIAL NEED FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HELP SOMALIA DO WHAT IT COULD NOT DO FOR ITSELF.

3. HENZE SAID HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY IMPRESSED BY THE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY SOMALI GOVERNMENT. U.S. WAS STRUCK BY EXTENT TO WHICH SOMALI GOVERNMENT HAD MADE MOST OF ITS OWN RESOURCES AS WELL AS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. U.S. WAS EXPECIALLY WILLING TO HELP THOSE  
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GOVERNMENTS WHICH HELPED THEMSELVES AND THIS SEEMED ESPECIALLY TRUE OF SITUATION IN SOMALIA. U.S. WAS COMMITTED TO PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

4. IRRENDENTISM IN DJIBOUTI AND KENYA: PRESIDENT SIAD THEN SAID HE WISHED TO RAISE SEVERAL POINTS REGARDING DJIBOUTI AND KENYA. BEGINNING WITH SOMALI POLICY TOWARDS DJIBOUTI, HE SAID LATTER PEOPLES WERE ALSO SOMALI PEOPLES -- AN OBVIOUS HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACT. NEVERTHELESS, DJIBOUTI SOMALIS HAD OPTED FOR INDEPENDENCE AND SOMALIA HAD ACCEPTED DJIBOUTI DESIRE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION. DJIBOUTI HAD JUST BEEN ACCEPTED INTO ARAB LEAGUE AT CAIRO SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER AND SOMALIA HAD SUPPORTED THAT APPLICATION. IT WAS THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT SOMALIA HAD NO RPT NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN DJIBOUTI. DJIBOUTI GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN STRONG TIES TO FRENCH, TO ARABS OR OTHERS WAS RIGHT WHICH SOMALIA WOULD RESPECT.

5. TURNING TO KENYA, SIAD SAID HE WANTED PRESIDENT CARTER TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOMALI GOVERNMENT HARBORED NO HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARDS KENYA. ON CONTRARY, SIAD HAD REPEATEDLY SOUGHT PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES.

ON THREE OCCASIONS IN PAST, SIAD HAD SUGGESTED TO KENYAN PRESIDENT KENYATTA THAT TWO COUNTRIES CONFEDERATE AND RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. SIAD CLAIMED HE HAD OFFERED TO RELINQUISH PRESIDENCY AS WELL AS PRIME MINISTERSHIP TO KENYANS, WHO HAD FAILED TO ACCEPT HIS OFFER.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----034445 091835Z /41

P R 091550Z SEP 77  
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS

6. AT PRESENT TIME, KENYANS WERE TALKING ABOUT HOSTILITY OF SOMALI INTENTIONS IN KENYA. THIS WAS FALSE. KENYAN FEARS UNJUSTIFIED AND WERE BEING PROVOKED BY OUTSIDE SOURCES. NOW PRESIDENT SIAD WISHED TO ASSURE PRESIDENT CARTER THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF CAUSING TROUBLE IN KENYA BUT WAS COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO BILATERAL PROBLEM OF SOMALIS IN KENYA. WHEN POST ASKED MORE SPECIFICALLY TO IDENTIFY PRIMARY PROBLEM BETWEEN SOMALIA AND KENYA, SIAD REFUSED TO ELABORATE. WHEN POST SUGGESTED THAT SOMALIA COULD PERMANENTLY RESOLVE KENYAN PROBLEM BY ACCEPTING PRESENT KENYAN/SOMALI BORDER, SIAD SAID THAT SOMALIA HAD PROPOSED ALL-INCLUSIVE SOLUTION, NOT A HALF

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MEASURE. WHEN HENZE NOTED THAT SMALL STEPS FREQUENTLY LED TO MAJOR GAINS IN RESOLVING DISPUTES, SIAD SAID SMALL STEPS WERE QUOTE WASTE OF TIME UNQUOTE. HE HOPED PRESIDENT CARTER COULD FIND SOME WAY TO HELP KENYANS UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAD NO HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARD KENYANS. HENZE SAID THAT U.S. SUPPORTED KENYAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ITS ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF IN SAME WAY THAT U.S. AGREED TO SUPPORT SOMALIA'S LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE NEEDS. US DESIRED STABILITY IN AREA. HENZE OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS COMMITTED TO REDUCTION OF US ROLE IN WORLD ARMS TRADE. THIS WAS ONE OF GOALS OF ADMINISTRATION. NEVERTHELESS PRESIDENT CARTER ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT IN SOME INSTANCES PROVISION OF DEFENSIVE ARMS WAS ESSENTIAL FOR STABILITY IN ENABLING COUNTRIES LIKE SOMALIA AND KENYA TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. THIS WAS BASIS OF US INTEREST IN DEFENSIVE ARMS NEEDS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

7. ETHIOPIA; SIAD TURNED TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WITH ETHIOPIA. IN FAMILIAR TERMS, HE CHASTIZED MENGISTU REGIME AS BLACK COLONIALISTS WHO HAD LIQUIDATED ENEMIES; SLAIN STUDENTS, WORKERS, INTELLECTUALS, ETC.; TERRORIZED ALL LEVELS ETHIOPIAN SOCIETY AND HAD CONSISTENTLY VIOLATED HUMAN RIGHTS. SOMALIA WAS COMMITTED TO FREEDOM AND JUSTICE. HE ASKED HOW US COULD STAND BY AND PERMIT ETHIOPIAN COLONIZATION AND OPPRESSION TO CONTINUE. ETHIOPIANS WERE COLONIALISTS IN SAME WAY IN WHICH SOME WESTERN POWERS HAD BEEN COLONIALISTS. ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS COLOR OF SKIN. BRITISH COLONIALISM HAD RETREATED BECAUSE ENGLISH HAD THE INTELLIGENCE TO RECOGNIZE THAT COLONIAL DOMINATION COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED IN PERPETUITY. IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEGOTIATION OF PANAMA CANAL TREATY, HE HAD DEMONSTRATED UNDERSTANDING AND FORESIGHT IN RESOLVING PEACEFULLY A POTENTIAL DANGEROUS PROBLEM.

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8. FOR THAT REASON, SOMALIA HAD REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE PEACEFUL SOLUTION WITH MENGISTU REGIME. AT ONE TIME, SIAD HAD PROPOSED CONFEDERATION WITH ETHIOPIA. ALTHOUGH MANY OBSERVERS HAD SUGGESTED PROPOSAL WAS SOVIET-INSPIRED, THIS WAS FALSE. MENGISTU HAD REJECTED INITIAL SOMALI CONFEDERATION PLAN IN 1975 BY INSISTING THAT SOMALIA FIRST RETURN CANBERRA BOMBER WHICH HAD BEEN FLOWN TO HARGEISA BY ETHIOPIAN DEFECTOR. SIAD HAD PRO-

POSED ALL-INCLUSIVE RESOLUTION TO PROBLEM AND MENGISTU  
HAD COUNTERED WITH TRIVIAL CONDITION WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO  
WITH LARGER ISSUE. THIS CLEARLY SHOWED MENGISTU'S MENTALITY.

9. SIAD ALSO RECALLED THAT IN 1975, SOMALIS OF OGADEN ORIGIN  
HAD CREATED SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS FOR HIS GOVERNMENT.  
(FYI: OGADEN SOMALIS IN MOGADISCIO HAD CONDEMNED SIAD FOR  
HIS FAILURE TO SUPPORT MILITARY INSURGENCY IN OGADEN. END  
FYI.) SIAD WAS ATTACKED DURING CAMPAIGN WHICH INCLUDED CLANDES-  
TINE CIRCULATION OF ANTI-SIAD TRACTS IN STREETS OF MOGADISCIO.  
HE WAS FORCED TO IMPRISON NUMEROUS LEADERS IN 1975 BECAUSE  
OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS LIBERATION GROUP HAD CREATED IN SOMALIA.  
FOR THIS REASON ALSO, SIAD HAD SOUGHT TO NEGOTIATE WITH MEN-  
GISTU REGIME TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS. HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.  
HE COULD NOT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DO ANYTHING TO PRE-  
VENT THE WESTERN SOMALIA LIBERATION FRONT (WSLF) FROM  
SEEKING A SOLUTION THROUGH MILITARY MEANS. HE DENIED  
CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WERE ANY REGULAR SOMALI UNITS  
IN THE OGADEN ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT SOMALIA WAS AIDING  
THE WSLF).

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P R 091550Z SEP 77  
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AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GERMANY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS

10. WITH AID OF SOVIET WEAPONS, CUBAN AND RUSSIAN ADVISORS, MENGISTU'S REGIME NOW ENDANGERING STABILITY IN ENTIRE AREA. ETHIOPIA THREATENED SOMALIA AND IF SOMALIA A VICTIM OF ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION, ALL STATES IN THE REGION WOULD BE IN DANGER. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE THREATENED. FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATER WAYS WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY. SIAD RECALLED THAT SOVIETS HAD ATTEMPTED PERSUADE HIM TO INTERDICT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN GULF OF ADEN STRAITS BETWEEN RAS KANZIRA AND ADEN -- A PASSAGE WHICH HE IDENTIFIED AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN BAB EL MANDEB BUT SIAD HAD RESISTED SOVIET PRESSURES. HE WAS INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING FREE PASSAGE FOR ALL SHIPPING AND PRESERVING PEACE IN AREA. SIAD SAID THAT

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BECAUSE US HAD INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, PRESENT CRISIS IN AREA DEMANDED URGENT US ACTION.

11. HENZE SAID THAT AS PRACTICAL MATTER US HAD NO INFLUENCE WITH MENGISTU REGIME AND LITTLE LEVERAGE TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. US COULD DO LITTLE AT PRESENT. US WAS NOT RPT NOT PROVIDING ARMS TO EITHER ETHIOPIA OR SOMALIA BECAUSE PROVISION OF ARMS COULD ONLY INTENSIFY CONFLICT. SOVIET UNION WAS PROVIDING ARMS TO BOTH SIDES AND THIS WAS IN OR VIEW A DESTABILIZING FACTOR. YET US HOPED THAT FIGHTING WOULD STOP AND THAT TWO PARTIES MIGHT BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION. US STRONGLY SUPPORTED OAU MEDIATION EFFORT AND LOOKED TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO ATTEMPT TO BRING TWO PARTIES TO NEGOTIATION TABLE. US HAD PUBLICLY SUPPORTED OAU MEDIATION EFFORT.

12. SIAD LAUNCHED INTO CRITICAL REVIEW OF AOU MEDIATION EFFORT. HE SAID THAT OAU CHIEF OF STATE MEDIATION COMMISSION HAD BEEN CREATED SEVERAL YEARS AGO TO SOLVE PROBLEM BUT THAT TO DATE MEDIATION LEADERS HAD NOT VISITED SOMALIA OR ETHIOPIA. EFFORT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. OAU MEDIATION COMMISSION HAD RECENTLY MET AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. OAU SEC GEN ETEKI HAD MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ETHIOPIAN POSITION. ETEKI WAS ADMINISTRATIVE SEC GEN WITHOUT POLITICAL ROLE. IN ADDITION, SO LONG AS OAU HEADQUARTERED IN ADDIS ABABA, ETEKI WAS HOSTAGE TO ETHIOPIANS AND COULD ONLY TAKE CONTRARY POSITION AT THE RISK OF HIS OWN LIFE. SIAD CHARACTERIZED OAU AS A WEAK ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD SHOWN LITTLE COURAGE IN FACING UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. HE SAID IN CONCLUSION THAT AFRICANS LACKED THE CAPACITY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

13. HENZE OBSERVED THAT OAU WAS OFTEN IMPOTENT BUT NEVERTHE-

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LESS US HOPED THAT LARGER AFRICAN STATES MIGHT RECOGNIZE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND ATTEMPT TO MEDIATE SOLUTION. APART FROM THIS, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE US COULD DO.

14. SIAD SAID THERE WAS ANOTHER ANSWER: QUOTE GIVE US ARMS -- GIVE US ARMS UNQUOTE. EVEN IF US FOR ITS OWN REASONS OR INTERESTS COULD NOT PROVIDE DIRECT DELIVERY OF US ARMS TO SOMALIA, IT COULD ASK OTHERS TO GIVE GUNS TO SOMALIA. HE SAID IRAN WAS IMPORTANT POWER IN REGION AND HAD ABUNDANT SUPPLY OF US ARMS WHICH IT COULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO SOMALIA. AT AMBASSADOR ADDOU'S PROMPTING, SIAD SAID THAT EGYPT WAS ANOTHER SUPPLIER WHICH WAS PREPARED TO ARM SOMALIA IF US WOULD MAKE THOSE TRANSFERS POSSIBLE. SIAD CLAIMED THAT DURING RECENT STOPOVER IN CAIRO, HE HAD ASKED SADAT FOR EGYPTIAN MILITARY SUPPLIES. SADAT SAID THAT GOE WAS READY TO PROVIDE SOMALIA WITH EGYPTIAN ARMS IF US WOULD GUARANTEE TO REPLACE THOSE WEAPONS FURNISHED SOMALIA. ACCORDING SIAD, SADAT SAID HE WAS ONLY AWAITING THE WORD FROM WASHINGTON TO BEGIN ARMS DELIVERIES TO SOMALIA.

15. HENZE EXPLAINED CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON US WEAPONS DELIVERIES. EVEN IF PRESIDENT WAS WILLING -- WHICH HE WAS NOT -- US ARMS TRANSFERS REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL AND GIVEN FIGHTING IN OGADEN CONGRESS WOULD NOT SUPPORT ARMS FOR SOMALIA AT THIS JUNCTURE. SHIPMENTS US ARMS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ALSO REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN OR SITUATION CHANGE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENABLE ADMINISTRATION TO CONSIDER THIRD-COUNTRY ARMS DELIVERIES TO SOMALIA, CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED AND MOOD WAS AGAINST IT. SIAD INTERRUPTED TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WERE WAYS OF QUIETLY PROVIDING SUCH ASSISTANCE WITHOUT ANNOUNCING IT TO THE WORLD.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----034740 091851Z /53  
P R 091550Z SEP 77

FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS

16. WHEN HENZE REITERATED US DECISION NOT TO IMPLEMENT US DEFENSIVE ARMS DECISION UNTIL PRESENT WARFARE IN HORN HAD CEASED, SIAD ASKED WHAT HIS ALTERNATIVE WAS -- SHOULD HE NOW GO BACK TO MOSCOW TO APOLOGIZE TO THE RUSSIANS AND ADMIT HE HAD MADE A MISTAKE? SHOULD HE QUOTE GET DOWN ON HIS KNEES UNQUOTE AND APOLOGIZE -- PRESUMABLY FOR PURSUING SOMALI NATIONAL INTERESTS AT EXPENSE OF THOSE OF SOVIET UNION. SIAD SAID THAT THIS WOULD TAKE AWAY HIS FREEDOM AND FREEDOM WAS WHAT SOMALIA WAS FIGHTING FOR. HE INSISTED HE WOULD NEVER BACK DOWN.

17. SIAD THEN RECALLED THAT IN 1964 US FAILURE TO SUFFICI-  
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ENTLY ARM SOMALI MILITARY HAD FORCED HIM INTO THE HANDS OF RUSSIANS. HE NOTED THAT AF/E DIRECTOR POST HAD BEEN PRESENT IN SOMALIA DURING THIS TIME AND KNEW CRITICAL SITUATION HE WAS FACING. WHEN POST SAID THAT HE WAS IN WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME AND HE DISAGREED WITH SUGGESTION THAT US ACTION HAD FORCED SOMALIA TO DEAL WITH MOSCOW, SIAD REFUSED TO GIVE WAY OR TO HEAR OUT ANY ARGUMENT TO CONTRARY.

18. SIAD THEN REPEATED HIS CLAIM THAT IF SOMALIA FELL VICTIM TO ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION, EVERY NATION IN AREA WOULD BE AFFECTED. HE INSISTED THAT TIME FOR US TO MOVE HAD COME AND HE HOPED THAT HENZE WOULD CARRY THIS MESSAGE BACK TO PRESIDENT CARTER.

19. AT ONE POINT DURING DISCUSSION OF ETHIOPIAN SITUATION, SIAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE RUMORS THAT ETHIOPIAN DELE-



GATION HAD RECENTLY VISITED WASHINGTON IN ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. HENZE STATED THAT HE KNEW OF NO SUCH VISIT. SIAD SAID THAT REPORTS WERE ALSO RECEIVED STATING THAT MENGISTU HAD SENT FOUR MISSIONS TO ISRAEL IN ATTEMPT TO GAIN MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. HENZE SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO SUCH VISITS TO ISRAEL, BUT THAT IN ANY CASE US NOT RPT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT GOI MIGHT BE DOING WITH EPMG. SIAD MUTTERED WORDS TO EFFECT THERE NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL.

20. ON MATTER OF CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA SIAD SAID THAT CUBAN ADVISORS BEING REGULARLY FLOWN FROM ADEN TO ADDIS ABABA. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT FIGURES BUT SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE CUBANS THAN THE SEVERAL HUNDRED THAT HAD BEEN REPORTED. HE DENIED THEY WERE DOCTORS.

21. COMMENT: WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT SIAD NOW HAS SOME BETTER  
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OR MORE REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF US ARMS POSITION, HE MAY NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT SOME ADDITIONAL RESPONSE IS CALLED FOR FROM WASHINGTON GIVEN HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER. WE BELIEVE THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO DELAY AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM SIAD OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA (STATE 212390) FOR SHORT TIME. IF DEPT CONCURS, WE MAY THEN TELL SOMALI GOVERNMENT THAT FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS US WISHES TO ASSIST SOMALIA IN AIDING THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED BECAUSE OF FIGHTING IN OGADEN. THIS IS ABOUT AS POSITIVE A RESPONSE AS CAN BE MANAGED UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.  
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## Message Attributes

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SEPTEMBER 8, SIAD SOUGHT TO ASSURE U  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MASS, ET, SO, US, (MOHAMED SIAD BARRE)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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22 May 2009  
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